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OTTOMAN EXPANSIONIST POLICY 
IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
MEDITERRANEAN
CARMEL CASSAR
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY Mediterranean has often been described as ‘a 
battleground’ between the two great empires of  Catholic Spain in the West and the 
Muslim Ottomans in the East. It was a century during which the two great empires 
gave evidence of  their formidable might.  
Before the rise of  the Habsburg kings, Charles V and Philip II, the Catholic 
Kings of  Spain, Ferdinand and Isabella, who were responsible for the unification 
of  Spain, played as vital a part in creating the Spanish Empire as did the Ottoman 
sultans before the fall of  Constantinople in 1453.
The Political Scene in the Early Sixteenth Century Mediterranean
The union of  the Kingdoms of  Castile and Aragon, and the conquest of  Granada in 
1492 - the last Muslim stronghold on mainland Spain - did more than just unify Spain. 
It led to the creation of  a union of  two strong kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula 
which, apart from helping to generate a religious revival throughout the peninsula, 
also boosted exploratory navigation that led to a surge of  colonisation that helped to 
transform Spain into a global empire. On the one hand, the Castilians were mainly 
centred on the Americas. Colonization and territorial expansion was coupled with 
an economic policy meant to exploit to the maximum the commercial value of  the 
newly-conquered lands. On the other hand, Aragon centred on the Mediterranean. 
It had long been acquainted with the sea through her shipping. Aragon possessed 
islands like the Balearics, Sardinia and Sicily, and was committed to checking the 
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advance of  Islam in the Western Mediterranean. This old policy induced King 
Ferdinand to occupy and hold on to strategic points along the Northern African 
coast. So, through the union of  the kingdoms of  Castile and Aragon, the Spaniards 
were able to precede the Ottomans in the Maghreb. However, this occupation was 
precarious as the Spaniards were surrounded by Muslim inhabitants with thinly-
veiled hostile intentions. In the vacuum created by the fall of  native dynasties, there 
emerged the various hordes of  Muslim corsairs, the most fearsome of  which, sprung 
up in Algiers. 
Although the Ottoman Empire had at hand all the necessary resources to 
become a naval power, it lacked the requisite organization and leadership structure 
which the Barbary corsairs enjoyed. Therefore the alliance of  the Ottomans and the 
Barbary corsairs was not only a logical political step but also a practical proposition. 
When, in 1534 Hayreddin Barbarossa, the chieftain of  the Algiers corsairs and an 
intrepid seaman, submitted himself  to the Sultan and accepted the suzerainty of  the 
Sublime Porte, the Ottoman navy was suddenly transformed into one of  the great 
forces of  the sixteenth century Mediterranean scene. The acquisition of  Algiers thus 
extended the Ottoman power into the Western Mediterranean and also led to an 
unavoidable clash with Spain.1
Meanwhile, the giant tussle between Spain and France had not abated - 
their favourite fighting grounds being Flanders and North Italy. The Republic 
of  Genoa, which kept one of  the best fleets of  the Mediterranean, had originally 
sided with France, enabling the latter to challenge the Spanish fleet in the Western 
Mediterranean. But in 1528, Genoa switched over to the Imperial side, thus becoming 
a close ally of  Spain. This move was destined to have far-reaching repercussions 
on Mediterranean affairs. This was because ever since 1536 the Sultan had come 
to an understanding with the kings of  France that, whenever possible, they would 
jointly attack the Habsburgs. Indeed, in 1543 the Ottoman fleet had even wintered 
in the ports of  southern France.2  The Franco-Ottoman alliance, also termed as ‘the 
impious alliance’, caused much scandal in Christian Europe. It was an opportunity 
for both rulers to fight against the rule of  the Habsburg Emperor and his allies.3 
In September 1534, the Genoese admiral Andrea Doria led a coalition of  
Spanish, Papal and Venetian navies - assisted by the galleys of  the Order of  St John 
- in an attack on Coron in the south western Peloponnese. It was a move intended 
to assist the hard-pressed Venetians. But the success was short-lived for, by April 
  1 C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of  Power, (Basingstoke and New York, 2002), p. 288.
  2 F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of  Philip II, Eng. transl. 2 vols (Glasgow, 
1973), II, p.994; P. Earle, Corsairs of  Malta and Barbary, (London, 1970), p.55; Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy 
and the Levant: 1204-1571, .4 vols (Philadelphia, 1984), III. The Sixteenth Century to the Reign of  Julius III, p. 472; 
M. Fonteney & A. Tenenti, ‘Course et piraterie méditerranéen de la fin du moyen-âge au début du XIXème 
siècle’, in Course et piraterie: XVe Colloque internationale d’histoire maritime, San Francisco, 1975 (Paris, 1975), p. 86;  J.H. 
Pryor, Geography, Technology and War. Studies in the Maritime History of  the Mediterranean: 649-1571, (Cambridge, 
1988), p. 195; G. Parker, ‘The Dutch Revolt and the polarization of  international Politics’, in The General Crisis 
of  the Seventeenth Century, ed. by Geoffrey Parker and L.M.Smith (London, 1985), p. 59.
  3 R. B. Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent, 1520-1566, (Cambridge, Mass., 1944), p. 133.
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1535, the Ottomans recovered Coron. The difficulties encountered by the Ottoman 
force in mounting the naval side of  the operation, induced the Sultan to appoint 
Hayreddin as his Kapudhan Paşa (Admiral).4 No sooner in command, than the new 
Admiral gave the Christian powers a foretaste of  things to come when in a lightning 
attack he captured Tunis from the Spaniards in September 1534. 
Charles V undertook to build the nearby fortress of  La Goulette in order to 
recover Tunis - which he recovered in July 1535. The offensive, however, remained 
largely with the Muslim side. Indeed, during the summer of  1537, a large Ottoman 
force overcame Otranto in South Italy and moved to the Venetian-held island of  Corfu. 
The Ottomans had intended to go across the Adriatic but a full attack was called off, as 
the fortifications were deemed too daunting. Meanwhile, a hastily-arranged Christian 
alliance of  Venetian and Imperial navies, together with their usual allies - that included 
the galleys of  the Knights of  Malta - confronted an Ottoman fleet under Hayreddin off 
Prevesa (1538). The attack proved to be a resounding debacle for the Christian navies, 
for which Doria is generally blamed. The Christian alliance retreated, leaving the field 
clear for the Ottoman fleet to range all over the Mediterranean.5
Ottoman Domination in the Mid-Sixteenth Century Mediterranean
The psychological effect of  the Prevesa debacle was tremendous; indeed it marks 
the beginning of  complete ascendancy by the Ottoman navy over the eastern 
Mediterranean – a situation that was to remain unchallenged until the battle of  
Lepanto of  1571. The intervening period between 1538 and 1571 represents a new 
tense phase in the struggle between the Ottoman East and the Spanish West with the 
latter being completely on the defensive. The frontier of  this giant conflict shifted to 
the central Mediterranean - that is, to Tripoli, La Goulette, Malta, Sicily and South 
Italy - all held by Spain and its allies, the Knights of  St John.
In crude terms the struggle was being waged for the control of  the western 
Mediterranean. In practical terms, however, a viable balance of  power could only 
be affected along cultural grounds. The Spaniards were beyond doubt imperialist 
intruders in North Africa very much in the same way as the Ottoman presence in the 
Balkans was felt by the numerous nationalities of  the region. It was a long time before 
some semblance of  justice would be accomplished in the Balkans. But the score on 
North Africa was to be settled soon.
A sequence of  historical events made matters easier for the Ottomans. In 
October 1540, Venice concluded peace with the Sublime Porte – an uneasy and 
  4 Suleiman appointed Hayreddin Kapudan-i Derya (Grand Admiral) of  the Ottoman Navy and Beylerbey (Chief  
Governor) of  North Africa. Barbarossa was also given the government of  the Sanjak ("province") of  Rhodes, 
Euboea and Chios in the Aegean Sea.
  5 ‘Venice lost more than any other state [Christian allies in the war of  1537-1539] and ... no longer could 
mobilize a convincing military presence in the eastern Mediterranean’. D. Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and 
Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge, 2002), pp.148-149.
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delusive modus vivendi that yet suited Venetian mercantile interests. Precisely at this 
juncture, the French king Francis I, followed later by Henry III, established a close 
understanding with the Sultan. This enabled the Ottoman fleet, under Hayreddin, 
to irrupt into the western Mediterranean and operate jointly with the French 
fleet against Spain. This was an insidious thrust at Spanish and Imperial interests 
especially since the latter had failed miserably in attempting to expunge the corsair 
nest at Algiers in the autumn 1541. It was in this latter operation that Turgut Reis - 
better known as Dragut – distinguished himself. He was not as brilliant a strategist 
as Hayreddin was, but he possessed a certain craftiness which served him well in his 
turbulent career.
The collaboration of  the French with the Ottomans rendered the European 
coasts of  the western Mediterranean exceedingly vulnerable. During the calamitous 
years of  1543 and 1544, Reggio di Calabria was ransacked and burnt, and the 
same fate overtook Nice, Elba and the island of  Lipari, the Sicilian town of  Patti, 
and the Marian sanctuary of  Tindari. It is worth mentioning, however, that the 
two fleets only cooperated once, at the siege of  Nice in 1543.6  A brief  respite 
followed when Hayreddin died in the summer of  1546, at which point he was 
succeeded by Turgut. While Ottoman incursions in the western Mediterranean 
grew less frequent, pressure on Christian positions in the central Mediterranean 
became more and more intense. There can be no doubt that the man who ably 
orchestrated this shift in Ottoman strategy was none other but Turgut. Turgut's 
ambition was to have his own corsairing base. He had set his heart on acquiring the 
port of  Tripoli whose splendid harbour could be transformed into the most secure 
corsair haven on the coast of  North Africa.  So he craftily manipulated Ottoman 
muscle to wrest it. 
Turgut’s plans ran parallel with the interests of  the Ottomans – namely, the 
capitulation of  the Christian outposts in the central Mediterranean, and the wresting 
of  the remaining Spanish outposts in North Africa. Clearly Tripoli, Tunis, La Goulette 
(along with other smaller Spanish enclaves in Tunisia), Malta and Sicily were in the 
eye of  the storm that was to rage for a full quarter of  a century (1550-1575).
Although Ottoman power made itself  felt in other areas of  the Mediterranean 
as well, yet its main thrust was now directed at hammering the Spanish hold on 
the approaches to the western Mediterranean. The nadir of  Christian fortune 
was reached in the decade 1550-1560. The reduction of  the Spanish fortress at 
Djerba in July 1560, and the loss of  a good section of  the Spanish fleet under the 
Duke of  Medina Celi, allowed Turgut and the Ottomans a free run of  the central 
Mediterranean. Indeed this was a period of  crises that was only checked as a result 
of  the outcome of  1565 Siege of  Malta.7
  6 When the Franco-Spanish peace was signed in 1559, the Sultan could no longer use the alliance as an 
instrument of  aggression, and Ottoman influence in the western Mediterranean receded. 
  7 Goffman (p. 151) argues that ‘just as the conquest of  Vienna... might have opened central Europe to the 
Ottomans, so the conquest of  Malta, where a substantial host could have wintered, might have exposed Italy 
and even Iberia to their armies’.
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Turgut’s plan came near to succeeding – incredibly near – and in point of  fact 
some of  the component objective, were duly attained. But ultimately his strategy 
failed to dominate the central Mediterranean. Tripoli was liberated in 1551; Tunis 
and La Goulette were finally freed in 1574; while Malta and Sicily remained firmly 
in Christian hands denying the Ottomans ease of  access to the western basin of  the 
Mediterranean.
One is struck by a kind of  inevitability of  this outcome. All the great events 
that unfolded between 1550 and 1575 – in particular the 1565 siege of  Malta – 
were perfectly predictable, one might even say inevitable, considering the logic of  
historical circumstances of  the time in that particular region. When so much was at 
stake, it comes as no surprise that there were strategists of  acumen and insight – like 
the Grand Master de Valette – who foresaw the development of  the situation and 
exerted themselves to forestall the worse consequences.
The main arbiter of  these events was Turgut, backed by the full might of  the 
Ottoman Empire. The pivot point came when he persuaded the Sultan to man an 
armada which he would conduct against the more exposed Christian positions in 
the central Mediterranean. The year 1551 opened a fateful period of  bitter fighting. 
The Ottoman Empire mounted three major campaigns – in 1551, 1560 and 1565 
- during the course of  which it came within an inch of  achieving its objective of  
establishing its military hegemony over the central Mediterranean.
The Ottoman Empire: 1565- 1571
The Siege of  Malta had been a near thing, but it was the turning point in the war 
for the Mediterranean. Ottoman frustration at the failure of  capturing Malta, and 
suspicions that the Genoese had passed intelligence to the Knights of  Malta, induced 
Suleiman the Magnificent to order his Kapudhan Paşa, Piyale, to invade and 
conquer the Genoese island of  Chios in the Aegean. Chios was conquered almost 
without bloodshed.8 It has been suggested that the conquest of  Chios was a sort of  
compensation for the defeat in the siege of  Malta. Whatever the case it seems justified 
to assume that the capture of  Chios ‘marked the end of  Ottoman maritime expansion 
towards the West’.9  Indeed, it may be argued that the Ottomans had lost their fight 
for the control of  the Central Mediterranean.10   But this was not immediately clear. 
In fact up to 1580 the Ottoman Empire retained immense offensive potential, and 
although the Ottoman defeat in seizing Malta destroyed any chances of  dominating 
the Central Mediterranean, the situation in the region was far from stable. The 
Spanish military hegemony over northern Tunisia clashed with Muslim aspirations 
  8 Goffman, pp.152-153.
  9  Imber, p.60.
10 H.G. Koenigsberger, ‘West Europe and the Power of  Spain’, in The Habsburgs and Europe 1516-1660 (Ithaca, 
1971), p. 252. The Order celebrated in Malta the first and second centenary of  the Siege. See N[ational] 
L[ibrary of] M[alta], A[rchives of  the] O[rder of] M[alta] 261, ff. 24v, 26; AOM 272, ff. 34v-35.
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to occupy the same territory and it came to represent an imperialist imposition that 
continued to annoy the Muslims. In consequence, political equilibrium took a long 
time to be established.
Despite several handicaps, Ottoman galley fleets were very successful between 
1538 and 1571 and the Ottoman Empire was believed to be the greatest single naval 
power in the Mediterranean. The Spaniards were concerned with the Ottoman 
presence particularly as they had problems with the descendants of  the Moriscos 
at home. The frequency of  corsair raids and, above all, the growing danger from 
the presence of  the Ottoman fleet in the Western Mediterranean, made Granada, 
particularly vulnerable. There was good reason to fear a Morisco rising orchestrated 
in conjunction with an Ottoman attack for indeed, in 1565, three Morisco spies who 
had been arrested, revealed a plot for the seizure of  the Granada coast in the event 
of  an Ottoman success in the siege of  Malta. Unless something was done, Granada 
could easily become another battlefield in the war with the Ottomans. The hard-
fought Reconquista would be undone and the conflict would spread to the heart of  
Spain. Only with the decisive defeat of  the Ottoman fleet at the battle of  Lepanto in 
1571 did Spain manage to contain such fears.
In a recent study on the impact which the defeat at Lepanto had on the 
Ottoman Empire, the Turkish historian Onur Yilidirim argues that the battle’s 
major toll on Ottoman naval capacity, and the disastrous effects on the socio-political 
framework of  the empire, had consequences similar to the early Ottoman defeat 
at the hands of  the Mongols at the Battle of  Ankara in 1402.11 He further suggests 
that the defeat, after a long series of  victories both before and after that event, made 
Lepanto ‘look like an anomaly’. This may explain why the event did not receive the 
attention it deserved by Ottoman historiography.12  A proper understanding of  the 
Ottoman perspective of  the period is therefore essential.
Several factors contributed to the Ottoman military success in the sixteenth 
century. High on the list is an abundant supply of  men and military equipment 
which was unmatched by any other military power at the time. The Sultan’s 
government had a permanent supply of  troops at its disposal. There was also a 
small standing army of  men that not only had skilled fighters’ techniques but, 
as they lived and fought together, they had acquired an esprit de corps which 
provided a stable core to the Ottoman military system. All troops had a contractual 
obligation to serve the Sultan who could mobilize any number of  disciplined troops 
whenever he wished. Finally the Ottomans were adept in developing weapons and 
were quick to improve their military tactics by learning from their enemies and 
11 Lepanto had originally been conquered by the Ottomans, from the Venetians, in 1499 and from the start 
served as a maritime district of  the empire as it constantly furnished the imperial navy with oarsmen and 
warriors. See, for example, O. Yilidirim, ‘The Battle of  Lepanto and its impact on Ottoman history and 
historiography’, in Mediterraneo in Armi, ed. by R. Cancila (Palermo, 2007), p.535.
12 Yilidirim, pp.534-535. The author points out that so far the only specific treatment of  the defeat at Lepanto is 
the paper by Andrew Hess, ‘The Battle of  Lepanto and its Place in Mediterranean History’, in Past and Present, 
57 (1972), pp. 53-73.
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from their own mistakes.13 Unfortunately for the Ottomans, there were no strong 
sultans after the demise of  Suleiman the Magnificent in 1566. 
Suleiman the Magnificent (1522-1566), was succeeded by Selim II (1566-
1574), his only surviving son. The latter had a peaceful disposition and ruled thanks 
to the exceptional abilities of  his Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Paşa. But, it so 
happened that on his accession to the throne, Selim was faced with an on-going war 
in Hungary; a revolt in Yemen which led to the collapse of  Ottoman authority in that 
province; and an Arab revolt in the marshes to the north of  Basra in modern Iraq. 14
13 Details of  the institutional functions of   the Ottoman system and how it was geared to serve the Ottoman 
military system has induced many authors to write about the subject including Virginia Askan, Linda T. 
Darling, Caroline Finkel, Mehmet Genç, Colin Imber, Halil Inalcik, Şevket Pamuk and Stanford J. Shaw to 
mention a few of  the more important writers. Thomas Scheben has written a detailed account based largely on 
very reliable secondary sources entitled, ‘A State with an Army – An Army with a State? -  The Ottoman Power 
Machine’, in The 1565 Ottoman Malta Campaign Register, ed. and trans. by Arnold Cassola with the collaboration 
of  Idris Bostan and Thomas Scheben (Malta, 1998), pp.13-81.
14 Imber, p.61; cf  J. Richard Blackburn, ‘The collapse of   Ottoman authority in Yemen 968/1560-976/1568’, in 
Die I/Velz' dex Islams, n.s.19/1-4 (1980), pp. 119-176.  
Fig. 1: Portrait of  Suleiman II the Magnificent, from Ottomanorum Principum Effigies ab Ottomano 
ad Regnantem Achmatem III (Rome, 1699) 
National Library of  Malta Collection
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By 1569, however, the Sultan turned his attention towards the expansion the 
Ottoman Empire in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as Eastern Africa and the 
Indian Ocean at the expense of  the Portuguese. For this reason it was felt necessary 
for the Sultan to launch a major campaign against the nearby Venetian island of  
Cyprus that 
…lay across the vital sea-route from Constantinople to Alexandria, and whose conquest was seen as 
the essential prelude to an Ottoman thrust towards the south. 
Furthermore,
Cyprus surely presented an easier and more vulnerable target than Spain. 15
Cyprus had been under Venetian control since 1489 and had managed to 
avert an Ottoman attack thanks to Venetian skilful diplomacy and to the help which 
they got from France - the traditional allies of  the Ottomans in the West.16  In 1569 
Venice suffered two severe blows when the arsenal of  Venice blew up and when 
Spain, heavily preoccupied with the revolt in Granada, was not in a position to offer 
assistance. The time seemed ripe for the Sultan to invade Cyprus. On their part the 
Latin West never expected the island to be invaded mainly because the Ottomans 
had signed a treaty which at the time of  the invasion had not yet expired.17
The invasion of  Cyprus appears to have been the personal wish of  the Sultan 
and was strongly supported by two influential viziers Piyale Paşa and Lala Mustafa 
Paşa who came to command the Ottoman navy and the land forces respectively. 
The Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Paşa saw things differently. He believed that the 
invasion would result in an alliance between Venice, Spain, the Pope and their minor 
allies including the Knights of  Malta. He therefore opposed the war.18 The latter was 
proved right when Nicosia was taken on 9 September 1570. As the Venetians became 
increasingly more desperate, the Most Serene Republic entered into an agreement 
with Philip II of  Spain to launch a Christian naval offensive against the Ottoman 
Empire. This alliance, which became known as the Holy League, was joined by other 
Christian powers that included the Knights of  Malta.
The creation of  a Holy League between Spain, Venice, and the Holy See 
was well founded. The situation appeared so menacing that Philip II went so far 
as to order the evacuation of  the Balearic Islands. This unexpected order, which 
elicited heated protests from the city of  Barcelona, was not carried out in the end. 
15 Elliott, Europe Divided: 1159-1598 (Wiley-Blackwell, 2 edn, 2000), p. 190.
16 An anonymous report prepared for Emperor Charles V in 1556 asserts that Cyprus was the jewel of  the 
crown of  the Venetian Republic. At the time Venice received the equivalent of  a hundred thousand ducats per 
year in merchandize and another hundred thousand ducats were sent home by soldiers stationed there and 
through other means. It is then pointed out that the other Greek islands like Candia (Crete), Zante (Zakinthos), 
Cephalonia, Corfu, and other territories in their possession in the Levant, were valued more for the prestige of  
keeping them then for gain. Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emmanuele (Rome), Fondo Gesuitico, MS 398 f. 204. 
17 Imber, p. 62.
18 Imber, p. 63.
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The fleet of  the Holy League was finally assembled at Messina in September 1571 
under the command of  Don Juan of  Austria, fresh from his triumph in Granada, and 
immediately sailed into the Greek waters. 
The Ottomans learnt of  the preparations for a Christian armada in the early 
months of  1571 from reliable sources in Bosnia and Delvina (Southern Albania). The 
news caused great concern in Constantinople and the Divan (Council of  State) took 
drastic measures to meet the imminent dangers. The Ottomans believed that the 
Christian fleet was being assembled in order to stop the on-going siege on Famagusta 
in Cyprus. Moreover, the setting up of  a Christian armada was, for them, tantamount 
to a confrontation between Christianity and Islam. But the Ottoman fleet had no 
clear idea where the Christian allies would attack and wandered between Crete and 
the Ottoman possessions in the Adriatic in the hope that it would finally meet the 
Christians. It seems though that, during this futile exercise, many Ottoman soldiers 
began to abandon the fleet never to return. At the same time, the Ottoman leaders 
did nothing to stop the troops from leaving largely because winter was approaching 
and also because they began to think that the Christians lacked the courage to fight 
the formidable Ottomans.19
It turned out that the Ottomans had grossly miscalculated. On 7 October 
1571 the combined Christian fleet managed to defeat the Ottoman fleet in the 
Bay of  Lepanto, the last Venetian stronghold in Cyprus - although the Ottomans 
were still able to retain Famagusta. Yet this naval defeat dealt a huge blow to the 
Ottoman naval power in the Mediterranean. Sokollu was therefore proved right. Of  
the Ottoman commanders at Lepanto only Uluç Ali Paşa, the Governor-General 
of  Algiers, survived the battle and he later managed to reach Istanbul, with the 
remaining vessels.
This was the first major Ottoman naval defeat. On their part, despite the 
success at the battle of  Lepanto, the Christians failed to achieve any other strategic 
gains because winter was fast approaching so the fleet made haste to return to its 
bases.20
It is difficult to assess the real impact which the defeat at Lepanto had in the 
war for the Mediterranean.  It has often been suggested that the Ottomans held sway 
over the Mediterranean ever since the Prevesa debacle way back in 1538 and that the 
battle of  Lepanto of  1571 had brought an end to this. However one needs to keep 
in mind that the Ottoman imperial fleet never really gained control of  the Adriatic 
or the western Mediterranean, while their failure at the siege of  Malta put an end to 
Ottoman ambitions against Christian-held enclaves.21
At the same time the spectacular victory of  the Christian forces at Lepanto 
was to epitomize for contemporaries all that was most glorious in the crusade against 
Islam. It was an eternal source of  pride to those who, like Miguel de Cervantes, 
19 Yilidirim, pp. 541-542.
20 Imber, p. 63. 
21 Imber, ‘The navy of  Süleyman the Magnificent', in Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980), p. 224.
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had fought in the battle. Millions of  people in western Christendom saw in it a 
divine deliverance from the power of  the oppressor. But in actual fact, Lepanto 
proved curiously a deceptive triumph, and the attempt to follow it up was peculiarly 
unsuccessful. Furthermore the Christian lands remained largely open to Ottoman 
incursions and razzias for almost two centuries after Lepanto.22  However the general 
political situation of  the Mediterranean saw several other dramatic events before a 
certain kind of  equilibrium was reached during the 1580s. 
On their part, under the wise direction of  Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, the Ottoman 
arsenals immediately began to construct a new fleet, which by the summer of  1572 
emerged under the command of  Uluç Ali Paşa, a survivor of  Lepanto, who became 
Kapudhan Paşa.23  However this enormous war effort was carried out via a harsh 
policy of  taxation from the provinces of  the Ottoman Empire. The war only came 
to an end in 1573 when Cyprus was formally ceded to the Ottomans.24 As Ronald 
Jennings rightly remarks:
…none of  the parties which emerged victorious out of  Lepanto occupied any territories, won 
any strategic advantages, or were able to follow up that single isolated success. The Ottomans not only 
stripped Venice of  its richest and wealthiest possession, that is Cyprus, and its most important naval 
bases but also deprived Latin Christian pirates of  their most important base.25 
When, in the following year, the Venetian Republic concluded a separate 
peace with the Sublime Porte, Spain and the Ottomans were forced to face each 
other. The Spaniards, under Don Juan of  Austria, struck the first blow and were 
able to re-take Tunis in October 1573.26  Yet, Christian victory was to prove short-
lived.
The Ottomans in the late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries
The Ottomans continued to terrify the minds and hearts of  those living on the shores 
and coasts of  the Latin Mediterranean. The successful conquests in North Africa, the 
potential to conquer Christian occupied lands, and make successful incursions, all testify 
to the rapid recovery of  the Ottoman sea power from the disaster at Lepanto. In short, 
22 Galasso, ‘’Il mediterraneo di Filippo II’, Mediterranea. Ricerche storiche.  anno i (2004), pp. 9-18 esp. p. 11.
23 ‘Of  all the Mediterranean powers, the Ottoman Empire possessed the most abundant resources for shipbuilding. 
Timber, in particular, was available from the dense woodlands of  north-western Anatolia, near to the arsenals 
at Istanbul, Gallipoli and Izmit, and from the forested slopes of  the mountains along the southern shore of  the 
Black Sea. The supply was the envy of  foreign observers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and did 
not show signs of  exhaustion until the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.’   Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 
pp. 294-295. 
24 G. Hill, A History of  Cyprus vol.iii. The Frankish period, (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 950-1040. A worthy successor 
to Turgut, the dour Uluç Ali Paşa  – another redoubtable corsair chief  – made himself  felt. He was often to 
make his adversaries quake for the two decades after the 1565 Siege of  Malta. He had succeeded Hasan Paşa 
as ‘king’ of  Algiers and in January 1570, he unexpectedly marched overland from his base and captured Tunis 
from the Spaniards, but was unable to reduce the naval base at La Goulette. 
25 R. C. Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, 1571-1640, (New York, 1993), p. 5.
26 Dal Pozzo, Historia della sacra religione militare di San Giovanni Gerosolimitano, detta di Malta, 2 vols (Verona, 1703), I, 
62-64.
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Fig. 2: ‘Giannizzero andando alla guerra’, from Nicolo de Nicolai, Le Navigationi et viaggi nella 
Turchia (Antwerp, 1576).  
National Library of  Malta Collection
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the Ottomans showed no signs of  exhaustion. Much of  the Ottoman strength lay in the 
fact that all the resources needed for shipbuilding were available in the Empire.27 The 
success of  the Tunis campaign can be considered as testimony of  the quick recovery 
of  the Ottoman Imperial fleet from the disastrous naval defeat at Lepanto and the re-
establishment of  Ottoman hegemony over the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Yet despite the great show of  force, the Ottoman-Spanish struggle had entered 
a stage of  stalemate. It was practically the end of  the struggle that had started three-
quarters of  a century earlier, although the contemporaries were as yet unaware of  it. 
Thus soon after the naval battle of  Lepanto, the Ottoman Empire began gradually to 
mount a counter-offensive. Already by 1572 it was becoming questionable whether 
Spain could afford an all-out struggle in the Mediterranean, largely because the revolt 
of  the Netherlands was far from crushed. Fortunately for Spain and her Christian 
allies however, the Ottomans also had preoccupations of  their own. Slowly the two 
empires, locked in combat for half  a century, disengaged their forces. The Ottomans 
deployed them eastwards against their Persian enemies, the Spaniards westwards 
towards the new Atlantic battlefield. 
By the time the Spanish had vanquished their last adversary in 1574, the 
Ottoman commander Sinan Paşa, had completed the reversal of  the Ottoman's 
military and political standing in the Maghreb. In solid possession of  most of  North 
Africa, the Sultan could turn his attention to the task of  extending his authority to 
Morocco. Since the early sixteenth century the Saadi dynasty had set up a regime  in 
Morocco which was completely independent of  Ottoman influence. So, in 1576 the 
Sultan ordered the governor of  Algeria to support the Ottoman candidate for the 
throne of  Morocco ‘Abd al-Malik who subsequently invaded Morocco with the help 
of  Algerian troops and conquered it. ‘Abd al-Malik thus became the new Sultan of  
Morocco thanks to Ottoman support. 
On his part, though, ‘Abd al-Malik sought to ensure that his kingdom would 
remain independent from Ottoman hegemony. The immediate exterior threat to 
‘Abd al-Malik did not come from the Ottomans, whose power to impose their will in 
the western part of  North Africa remained rather limited. It came instead from the 
young king of  Portugal, Don Sebastião, who was determined to continue the crusade 
against the Moors, as well as to protect Portuguese interests in the Atlantic from the 
thrust of  Ottoman imperialism.28  The young king briefly managed to revive the 
notion of  Portuguese overland conquest and in 1578 he led a military campaign 
into Morocco. He was however defeated and his body was never found after the 
battle of  Alcázar Quibir. The battle brought the epoch of  large-scale warfare along 
the coast of  the Maghreb to an end.29 From then on the military activities of  the 
western Mediterranean during the 1580s were mostly of  the naval type dominated 
27 Imber, ‘The navy of  Süleyman’, p. 220.
28 Hess, 66-68.
29 J. Myhill, Language, Religion and National Identity in Europe and the Middle East: A Historical Study, (Amsterdam and 
Philadelphia, 2006), p. 66.
OTTOMAN EXPANSIONIST POLICY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY MEDITERRANEAN
95
by corsairing activities between two hostile civilizations – Christianity in the north 
and Islam in the south. What followed was a century of  equilibrium, with neither 
side strong enough to proclaim the Mediterranean mare nostrum.30 
The Maghreb was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire largely thanks to 
cooperation between the Ottomans and the North African Muslim corsairs who 
operated in the central and western Mediterranean. Yet, despite the central role 
played by the Maghreb states in Ottoman naval warfare, Ottoman administrative 
presence in the area was weak with the result that it remained ‘a terra incognita of  
Ottoman administrative historiography’ rightly described by Andrew C. Hess as ‘the 
forgotten frontier’.31  The link between the Ottoman imperial administration and 
North Africa was mainly maintained through the corsairing activities which were 
undertaken at the expense of  Christian lands and shipping.
Corsairing increased with the emergence of  Algiers as the corsairing centre par 
excellence under Hayreddin after 1534, and with the conquest of  key geographical 
areas along the North African coast by Spain. In the end, the employment of  corsairs 
and the incorporation of  Algeria helped to change Ottoman strategy. Corsairs 
began to play a leading role in diplomatic relations between the Ottomans, on the 
one hand, and France and Morocco, on the other. The role played by Algiers in 
Franco-Ottoman relations became so central that by 1580 the French established an 
embassy there.32 Marseilles in particular gained special importance because North 
African corsair vessels bought raw materials, munitions, and victuals from there, and 
also because it served as a place from where they obtained vital information. The 
relationship between France and Algiers remained strong as far as both France and 
the corsairs perceived each other as natural allies against the Spanish Habsburgs. 
Algiers thus played a vital role in Franco-Ottoman relations. Similarly the Ottomans 
depended on Algiers to formulate their Moroccan policy.33
Concluding Remarks
A close look at the way the Ottoman Empire functioned provides a clue to their 
activities in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. The era is held to be a 
period of  transformation in Ottoman historiography largely because it was a crucial 
phase of  changes, economic crises and social turmoil.34 
30 S. Bono, Il Mediterraneo da Lepanto a Barcellona,  (Perugia, 1999), pp. 12, 34, 176.  S. Soucek, ‘Tunisia in the Kitab-i 
Bahriye by Piri Reis’, Archivum Ottomanicum, V (1973), pp. 129-296 esp. pp. 132-133.
31 A. C. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier; also E.S. Gürkan, ‘The centre and the frontier: Ottoman cooperation with the 
North African corsairs in the sixteenth century’, in Turkish Historical Review, I (2010), pp. 125-126.
32 Léon Galibert, Storia di Algeri dal primo stabilimento de’ cartaginesi, (Florence, 1847), vol.1 p. 346; see also Gürkan, 
pp. 125-163 esp. p. 137.
33 Gürkan, pp. 137-138.
34 H. Inalcik, ‘The Ottoman decline and its effects upon the Reaya’, in H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, 
Organization, and Economy, (London, 1978), pp. 338-354; and H. Inalcik, ‘Military and fiscal transformation in 
the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700’1600-1700’, in Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 283-337.
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The Ottomans enjoyed a long period of  stability, agricultural development, 
and growing prosperity throughout the sixteenth century. But by 1595, things did 
not remain that good. When Murad III (1574-1595) was succeeded by his son 
Mehmed III (1595-1603), the Ottoman Empire passed through a severe crisis on the 
battlefield. The death of  the Sultan led to widespread riot and confusion throughout 
the empire. A document at the Vatican Archives refers to a report of  Guglielmo 
Silenche, Captain of  a French ship, which had just arrived in Malta from Zante at 
the end of  July with fresh information from Constantinople. The death of  the Grand 
Turk in Adrianople (modern Edirne) had led to widespread rebellions in Greece and 
Transylvania. Furthermore Captain Silenche reported that an Ottoman armada of  
some fifty galleys was in the Gulf  of  Negropont, while another large squadron of  
some thirty galleys had gone to Alexandria for provisions. Both fleets were on the 
verge of  mutiny.35
The instability that broke out on the death of  Murad III may suggest that 
the conquests of  the late sixteenth century induced the Sublime Porte to install 
garrisons throughout the empire. However, despite the pragmatism, flexibility, and 
the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, the Ottoman Western provinces 
(Algeria, Tripolitania, Tunisia) were the most difficult to control since they were 
geographically distant from Constantinople. Instability, resulting from economic and 
political problems, combined to the rising power of  the new ruling elite, became a 
feature of  trouble in the peripheral areas of  the empire - not least so in the Maghreb 
where a new international conjuncture strengthened the autonomy of  the regencies 
particularly that of  Algiers.
35 Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Segreteria di Stato, Malta, vol. 6, fol. 136. Mehmed III began his rule with severe fiscal 
and military difficulties coupled with rising internal conflicts that became endemic in the following century. 
The decline of  the central political structure was accompanied by the rise of  provincial elites who had greater 
influence on the evolution of  regional economies. 
